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THE LEGAL EFFECT OF INSOLVENCY ON BANK DEPOSITS
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Introductory
Before proceeding with the main topic, it may perhaps be worthwhile
to state briefly the general law governing deposits. Bank deposits may be
of two kinds: general and special. In the case of the general deposit, the
legal relationship is that of debtor and creditor, while in the case of special
deposit, it may, technically, be either bailor and bailee, principal and agent,
or trustee and cestui que trust.1 Under the debtor and creditor relationship,
title to the res passes instantly with the deposit to the depositee, the latter
being free to deal with it as he chooses and becoming liable to the depositor
for an equivalent amount. The depositor in his turn becomes a general creditor. Under the bailee and bailor relationship, title to the res does not pass
to the depositee but only possession, and, presumably, as in cases of bailment
of chattels other than money, a general lien on the res will result in favor
of the bailee, permitting him to hold it as security for payment of charges
that may grow out of the contract of bailment. Under the principal and
agency relationship, technically, neither title nor possession but only custody
passes to the agent. The agent can do no more than what his express or
implied authority from the principal will permit him to do, nor has he in
point of theory even a lien on the res. To support a lien possession will be
necessary, and that he would not have if the res comes to him from the
depositor directly, or has been first reduced to the possession of the depositor.
Under the trustee and cestui que trust relationship, the legal title passes to
the trustee while the equitable title rests in the cestui que trust. In any of
the last three named relationships the res itself, in its original or changed
form, and the proceeds when converted into money that can be traced, must
t Dean, Miami College of Law. B. A., University of Kentucky, 1913; M. A., Clark
University, x915; J. D., Northwestern University, 1924. Instructor, University of Louisville Law School, 1924-28; University of Miami Law School, 1928-32; Vanderbilt Unisity Law School, summer sessions, 1929-30. Contributor to anthropological and legal
journals. For a more detailed treatment of some phases of the present topic by the same
author, see Acceptance of Deposits by Banks When Insolvent, in the FLORMA BAR Asso-

cIATION LAW JOURNAL, for April, 1931.

'See Commercial Bank of Pa. v. Armstrong, 148 U. S. 50, 13 Sup. Ct. 533 (1892);
Collins v. State, 33 Fla. 429, I5 So. 214 (1894), and authorities cited; Camp v. First National Bank, 44 Fla. 497, 33 So. 241 (192) ; City Bank of Fort Lauderdale v. Hart, 136
So. 446 (Fla. 1931) ; Miami v. Shutts, 59 Fla. 462, 51 So. 929 (19io) ; see also Mallett v.
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terminate the debtor-creditor relationship and constitute the bank a trustee; see also Baker,
Bank Deposits and Collections (1913) I MicH. L. REV. 122 (commenting upon application of principal and agent) ; Turner, Deposits of Dentand Paper as "Purchases" (i928)y
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be preserved and kept intact, and will, except as against a third party who is
a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, put the depositor in the position of a preferred claimant.
There is no set criterion by which a deposit may be determined to be
general or special. To be sure, in the final analysis, it is the mutual intent
as ascertained from either expressed provisions and agreements, or implied
from the nature of the dealings and conduct of the parties, and the custom
prevailing in the locu in quo that governs. Indorsements of commercial
paper, however, have been variously treated and construed by the court.
Thus, if matured or demand paper is endorsed to a bank "for collection"
or "for deposit", the deposit is said to be presumptively at least, a special
deposit, and the bank will not become a debtor until it is paid. A like presumption is said to obtain if such paper is endorsed "for deposit to the
credit of" the depositor. But if such paper is endorsed "for collection and
credit", the above presumption has not been applied by some courts, and the
bank is treated as a debtor from the time the deposit was made. 2 Again,
if matured or demand paper is endorsed in blank, without anything more,
and if credit be given at the time of the deposit to the depositor, there are
decisions holding both ways. The majority hold that the bank becomes at
once a debtor, while with other courts it becomes only a special depositee or
trustee. 3 Collection, by the weight of authority, has been held to change
the legal relation of the parties, making the depositee a debtor as soon as
collection is made and credited irrespective of the nature of the indorsement. 4 But, even after collection, sometimes by undue refinement, the mere
use of a particular word or words by way of direction, although done perhaps inadvertently, has been seized upon by some courts in deciding one way
or another. Thus, where paper was sent "for collection and remittance", 5
"for account", or "for collection and return",6 it was held that collection
will not terminate the special deposit. On the other hand, when there was
a direction "forward draft to me for balance less your fees", it was held
that the collecting bank will become a debtor to the owner of the note immediately after collection, the court construing the word "draft" as indicative
of an intent on the part of the sender not to make the money collected a
'See Nyssa Arcadia Drainage District v. First National Bank, etc., 3 F. (2d)

(1925), and ScoTT,
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SELECTED CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON THE LAw OF TRUSTS (Ist

ed. igig) 64n.
'Halloway v. Dykes. 29 F. (2d) 430 (1928) ; SCOTT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 66, 67.
Cf. Williams v. State, 139 So. 393 (Miss. 1932), where acknowledgment from the bank
was accompanied by notice that the bank would act only as a collecting agent.
'Ravnor v. Scandinavian, etc. Bank, I=z Wash. I.O, 21o Pac. 499 (1Q22); State v.
Banking Corp., 77" Mont. 134, 2.51 Pac. 151 (1926); Walker v. McNeill, b8 Fla. 181, 66
So. 994 (1914), the latter holding trust because the paper was not yet collected; Williams
v. State, supra note 3.
1 ScoTr, op. cit. supra note 2, at 68.
'Nyssa Arcadia Drainage District v. First National Bank, etc., supra note 2.
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special deposit.7 It has also been held that a debtor-creditor relationship
arose after collection where the paper was marked "for collection or return".,
It would seem that under the view taken by the latter opinions the
deposit should be general in those cases even before collection since ultimately
it is the intent that determines the relationship, and if the use of the word
"draft", for instance, is in itself sufficient to indicate an intent not to make
the money a special deposit after collection, why should not the same intent
control from the very time of deposit? By analogy, the situation where
the word "remit" is used was construed as indicative of an intent to continue a deposit as a special deposit even after collection.'
The nature of the dealings between the parties and their business customs have likewise been treated ambiguously by the courts; thus, in one
federal case the court has this to say:
"The practice, which has grown up among banks, to credit such
deposit at once to the credit of the depositor, and to allow him to draw
aganst them before the collection has been made, is reckoned by the
ablest text writers a mere gratuitous privilege which does not grow into
a binding legal usage." 10
Under this decision, therefore, a mere deposit of a check by a customer
will not pass title until collected, despite customary dealing on a cash basis.
Other cases, however, are of the opposite effect. In FirstNationalBank
of Elkhart v. Armstrong," for example, the court disregarded the indorsement "for collection for the First National Bank of Elkhart" and because
of customary dealing and understanding between the two banks to credit
the deposits as cash subject to payment, and to allow drawing against such
deposits, held that title to the deposits passed to the collecting bank immediately, and the forwarding bank had the rights of a general creditor only.
The fact that an account is overdrawn is generally held to pass title to
paper deposited for collection, 1 2 perhaps because the bank is in the position
I Sayles

v. Cox, 95 Tenn. 579, 32 S. W. 626 (1895), citing Aiken v. Jones, 93 Tenn.
S. W. 669 (1894) ; I MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING (6th ed. 1928) § 305.
v.
McKinley County Bank, 32 N. M. 147, 252 Pac. 98o (1927).
'State
'Turner, Bank Collections-The Direct Routing Practice (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 468
(criticizing view of termination of agency after collection).
" St. Louis & S. F. Ry. v. Johnston, 133 U. S. 566, 10 Sup. Ct. 390 (89o), rev'g 27 Fed.
243 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1886) ; see also Balbach et al. v. Frelinghuysen, 15 Fed. 675 (C. C. D.
N. J. 1883), citing MORSE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 522. Similar in effect is First National
Bank v. Armstrong, 42 Fed. 193 (C. C. S. D. Ohio I8go), where the court gave more weight
to the words "for collection" used in the endorsement and the words "subject to payment"
used in the crediting of the deposit, than to the customary dealings between the parties, by
which the paper would be credited to the depositor immediately upon deposit and would
become at once subject to draft and interest on daily balance.
"39 Fcd. 231 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1889). Of like effect is Franklin County National
Bank v. Beal, 49 Fed. 6o6 (C. C. D. Mass. 1892), except that in the latter case the endorseinent was "for collection and credit". The use of the word "credit" may be of some significance in showing an intent to pass title, Nyssa Arcadia Drainage District v. First National Bank etc., supra note 2.
"See note to Sayles v. Cox, supra note 7, in 32 L. R. A. 715 (1896), and Balbach et aL.
v. Frelinghuysen, supra note Io.
353,
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of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, in jurisdictions where
antecedent debts are sufficient to constitute "value".
Outward expressions and acts are taken generally as determinative of
intention, but the decisions on this point are not uniform, especially where
only one party does the act. Thus, a deposit kept apart by the bank was held
not to be a special deposit on the ground that the intention to treat it as a
special deposit was undisclosed and unknown to the depositor. 13 However,
it would seem that where the keeping apart is for the benefit of the depositor,
as was the case here, consent on his part should be presumed, just as it is
ordinarily presumed in cases of gifts and benefits under a trust.
This necessity for construction and the accompanying difficulties attendant upon deposits of commercial paper is generally obviated where the
deposits are in cash, and they may be said to stand in the same position as
deposits of paper after collection, which, under the majority rule, will ordinarily pass title from the time of receipt, subject to the qualifications indicated above and those to be indicated hereafter.
Effect of Insolvency
The leading case in this country with regard to the effect of insolvency
is St. Louis and S. F. Railway Co. v. Johnston.14

The case may be said

to have established firmly the general rule since followed by the great majority of jurisdictions in this country.1 5 The rule is that when a bank is
hopelessly insolvent, and this fact is known to its officers but not to its depositors, the receipt of money on general deposit is a fraud on the depositor and
will raise a trust enabling him to reclaim the deposit.
It is worthy of mention that in the case just cited the deposit was by
a draft, which was not collected at the time the bank closed its doors, and
while the court favored the view that mere crediting of the draft on the
books of the bank and allowing the depositor to draw against the credit did
not pass title to the bank, so that the decision could have been rested on the
ground that the bank was the agent of the depositor, it nevertheless preferred
the ground of fraud.
Various theories have been suggested with regard to the legal operation
of the above rule. With some courts it would seem that the acceptance of
deposits with knowledge of hopeless insolvency is characterized as a fraud
so that the party is entitled to rescind the transaction and recover the deposit,
thus implying that title has passed but that the transaction is voidable at the
will of the depositor; with others, the effect of the fraud is not to pass title
Washington etc. Manufacturing Co. v. Duke,

126

R. 611, 617 (i923), and collected cases cited therein.

Wash.

510,

218 Pac.

232,

37 A. L.

14

Supra note i0.

'n See annotation to Winifred Steele v. Allen et aL., in (1922) 2o A. L. R. 12o6, giving

copious citations for the various states, Canada and England, adhering to the same rule.
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at all, so that the property to the deposit is said to remain in the depositor
subject to his orders, the banker presumably standing in the position of bailee
or agent; while still others adopt the view that the fraud will create a trust
16

ex maleficio.

It must be said, however, that the language of the courts is often confusing, and does not indicate clearly which one of these theories is preferred.
Thus, in one case, the court said:
"The reception of the money and checks, under such circumstances,
was a fraud upon the plaintiff, and entitled him to rescind the transaction, and recover back his deposit from the bank. The keeping of the
bank open, and the conducting of its business in the usual manner, constituted a representation to its customers of the solvency of the bank,
upon which they had the right to rely; and, if the bank was known to
be insolvent by the officers who were charged with its management, the
concealment of that fact from a person about to make a deposit would
constitute a fraud upon him. The title acquired by the bank to the
money and checks deposited under such circumstances would be voidable
at the election of the depositor, who could bring suit to recover his
deposit without any previous demand. The bank would become a trustee ex maleficio, and would hold the deposit for the use of the depositor,
and subject to his right of reclamation." 1?
The court here relies not only upon the idea of rescission, which necessarily presupposes title to have passed, but also upon the idea of a trust ex
maleficio, which in point of theory would presuppose a split of title with the
legal title resting in the bank as trustee and the equitable title in the beneficiary or, in this case, the depositor."'
However, no matter which be the theory relied upon, the legal effect is
the same. By either theory the depositor .will hay th right to recover the
whole of the deposit without having to come in and share pro rata as a general
creditor, except perhaps so far as the question of the election of remedies is
concerned.' 9
"Ames, Following Misappropriated Property into its Product (i9o6) 19 HAv. L.
REV. 511; Scott, The Right to Follow Money Wrongfully Mingled with Other Money (1913)
27 HARV. L. REV. 125, and note in (1922)
2o A. L. R. 12o6.
'Wasson v. Hawkins, 59 Fed. 233 at 234 (C. C. D. Ind. 1894).
'8 Accord: Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. Indianapolis National Bank, 65 Fed. 69o (C. C.
D. Ind. 1895); Quin v. Earle, 95 Fed. 728 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1899) ; Richardson v. New
Orleans Coffee Co., 102 Fed. 785 (C. C. A. 5th, 19oo) (confusing agency and trust) ; Butler
v. Western German Bank, i.sg Fed. 116 (C. C. A. 5th, 19o8) (failing to preserve a like
distinction with regard to the question of interest on the deposit) ; Brennan v. Tillinghast,
2oi Fed. 609 (C. C. A. 6th, 1913); Hutchinson v. National Bank of Commerce, 145 Ala.
196, 41 So. 143 (19O6).

"See in this connection Ames, supra note 16, suggesting that under the constructive
trust theory, if money of the depositor is wrongfully mixed by the wrongdoer with an equal
amount of his own money, and part of it withdrawn, the claimant would be entitled only to
half of what is left, he being a co-owner of the whole or every part of the whole. See also
Scott, supra note

16.
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The practical application of the general rule allowing recovery of the
whole deposit requires the presence of certain conditions, and these in turn
give rise to considerable refinement and controversy by the courts.
These conditions are: (i) the bank must be hopelessly insolvent; (2)
the officers of the bank must have knowledge of the insolvency; (3) the
funds must be capable of identification or tracing in the hands of the receiver or liquidator; (4) they must not have come into the hands of a bona
fide purchaser for value without notice. Most of the controversy rages over
the construction of these conditions, particularly with regard to knowledge
and tracing, the weight of authority favoring a liberal construction; the
20
minority, a strict construction.
Thus, by the majority, knowledge need not be accompanied by actual
22
intent to defraud.2 1 In St. Louis and S. F. Railway Co. v. Johnston, it
was held sufficient that the president of the bank knew of its insolvency.
In one case, after declaring it error to require affirmative proof that
the officers knew of the insolvency, and quoting Wignore, 23 who recites
various indications pointing to the probability that a given person obtained
knowledge, one of which is the surrounding circumstances, or what Wigmore
calls "the quality of the occurrence", the court continues:
"We will not further quote from this philosophical discussion,
but will be content with the observation that one who was impelled on
one day to make an assignment for the benefit of creditors because of
an insolvency so hopeless as was the case here must have been in such
direct exposure . . . to the facts as to have charged him with knowledge
of their existence. And the quality of the occurrence . . . speaks very
strongly to the belief that . . . the conditions bringing about such
occurrence were known to the actors." 24

And this from a Washington court:
"The keeping of a bank open in the usual manner for the transaction of business is a representation to every person dealing with it that
the bank is able to keep and perform its contracts and that the person so
dealing takes upon himself nothing more than the ordinary risks incident
to the business; in other words, it is a representation that the bank is
solvent. If the fact be that the bank is insolvent, the representation so
made is a false representation, ....

."

25

Knowledge of an agent of employee of a bank is generally sufficient if
the wrong-doing has extended over a considerable length of time and the
I STORY, EQUITY JUISPRUDENCE (i4th ed. I918) §§ 187-265; I PERRY, TRUSTS (7th
1237-1239, 1320-1329; BOGERT, TRUSTS
§ 29; and cases cited infra note 29.
This is really applying the test used in tort and criminal actions, as to what a reason-

1929) § iSI; 2 MORSE, op. cit. supra, note 7 at
(i921) I2I; TIFFANY, BANKS AND BANKING (1912)

ed.

able prudent person would have anticipated and done under similar circumstances.
=Supra note 1o.
EVIDENCE (Ist ed. 1904) §245.
"In re Silver, 2o8 Fed. 797 at 799 (N. D. Ohio
2'I WIGmoRE,

1912).

2'Raynor v. Scandinavian Bank, supra note 4, at 159, 2IO Pac. at 503.
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agent is the only one representing the bank in the particular transaction. In
a leading Massachusetts case where the question was whether an act of
embezzlement on the part of the treasurer of a corporation and the knowledge of it should be imputed to the principal, the court in answering in the
affirmative, says:
"It is true, that no officer of the plaintiff besides Gray knew of
the fraudulent origin of these checks; but, in the very transaction of
receiving them, the plaintiff was represented by Gray, and by him alone,
and is bound by his knowledge. It is the same as if the plaintiff's directors had received the checks knowing what he knew." 2'
To satisfy tracing and augmentation, by the majority rule, it is sufficient that the money in question be traced into and augment the common
mass, and that it be not dissipated prior to its coming into the hands of a
receiver or liquidator.
Thus, according to Knatchbull v. Hallett,27 the leading English case on
the subject of tracing, money when fraudulently mixed with other money
becomes impressed with a trust, so that subsequently, when money is paid out
of the mixed mass it will be considered as coming from that part which
legally may be dispersed, the court proceeding on the idea that a trustee is
honest rather than dishonest and will be presumed to pay out money that
he may properly pay out. The only requirement under this rule is that there
be enough money at all times, i. e., from the time of confusion to the time
of failure, equal to or greater than the sum claimed; it would not be neces28
sary for the money to be kept separate or the identical money preserved.
The cases in this country have generally adopted the rule laid down in Knatch29
bull v. Halett
In Richardsonv. New Orleans Debenture Redemption Co., the court in
alluding to the former doctrine requiring identity says this:
Atlanta Cotton Mills v. Indiana Mills, i47 Mass. 268, at 273, 17 N. E. 496 at 5oi
(1888). Clark Sparks & Sons Mule & Horse Co. v. Americus National Bank, 23o Fed. 738
(S. D. Ga. I916) ; Martin v. First National Bank of Rush City, 51 F. (2d) 84o (D. C. D.
Minn. i931) ; Orme v. Baker, 74 Ohio St. 337, 78 N. E. 439 (igo6). What applies to embezzlement would all the more apply to a civil case, as in criminal actions the tendency is not
to impute the act of the agent to the principal where the former is not an innocent party.
2 13 Ch. D. 696 (i88o).

See also James Roscoe (Bolton),

Ltd. v. Winder, [1915] I

Ch. 62.
' The decision in Knatchbull v. Hallett, supra note 27, has been somewhat modified by
In re Oatway [19031 2 Ch. 356.
'National Bank v. Insurance Co., 104 U. S. 54 (881) ; Peters v. Bain, 133 U. S. 670,
IO Sup. Ct. 354 (i89o); Schuyler v. Littlefield, 232 U. S. 707, 34 Sup. Ct. 466 (914);
Hirning v. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 52 F. (2d) 382 (C. C. A. 8th, 193);
Bank of Springfield v. Therrell, 138 So. 733 (Fla. 1932) ; Shaw v. McCord, i8 S. W. (2d)
200 (Tex. 1929); cf. McGregor v. Battle, 128 Ga. 577, 58 S. E. 28 (19o7) ; Hughes v.
Lake, 63 Miss. s52 (1886); Wilson v. Coburn, 35 Neb. 530, 53 N. W. 466 (1892); Perth
Amboy Gas Light Co. v. Middlesex Bank, 6o N. J. Eq. 84, 45 AtI. 704 (i9oo), and cases
cited therein; Commercial & Farmers National Bank of Baltimore v. Davis, 115 N. C. 226,
20 S.
. 370 (1894); Venner v. Cox, 35 S. W. 769 (Tenn. 1895); Sayles v. Cox, supra
note 7.
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"The equitable right of following misapplied money .

.

. de-

pended on identifying it, the equity attaching to the very property misapplied.

Money . . . had no earmarks, and the tracing of the fund

would fail. This view was manifestly inequitable and unjust, and so,
finally, it was held that confusion by commingling does not destroy the
equity, but converts it into a charge upon the entire mass, giving to the
party injured by the unlawful diversion of the fund a priority of right
over the other creditors of the possessor and wrongdoer

. .

. To create

the trust it is not necessary to show that the identical money went into
the hands of the receiver. It is sufficient if the funds in his hands are
increased by the deposit." 80
In Sanders v. Stevens, 31 the court denied preference to the drawer of a
check, where the proceeds were set off by a corresponding bank against the
defunct bank's indebtedness on the ground that since the money had never
been mixed with the assets of the defunct bank, there was no such augmentation of assets as is necessary.
In Cuttell v. Fluent,3 2 the court refused priority where the draft went
to a correspondent bank, which collected and credited it to the account of
the insolvent bank. At the time the draft was credited to the insolvent bank
the latter had a credit balance with the correspondent bank, but the account
was overdrawn when the insolvent bank was taken over by the comptroller
of currency. There was no evidence that any proceeds of the draft, directly
or by substitution, at any time were commingled with the cash funds of the
insolvent bank coming into the hands of the receiver. Because of the latter
circumstance the court held that there was no augmentation of the assets
of the insolvent bank.
33 except
Of like effect is Schumacher v. Harriett,
that in the latter case
the court held that it is a sufficient commingling and augmentation of assets
merely to deposit checks to the credit of the depositor, considering these
checks as cash because of their being treated as cash. The court said: 34
"Under modem banking conditions, the rule as stated should be
held to apply to cash items received by a bank under a trust agreement
as well as to cash so received. Such an item for all practical purposes
differs not at all from currency. It increases the cash funds of the bank
just as much as does the deposit of currency. If the bank cashes it
and covers the proceeds into its vaults, the augmentation, of course, is
apparent. If, however, the bank treats the cash item as its own and
so102

Fed. 78o, at 783 (C.C. A. 5th, igoo).

To the same effect are Western German

Bank v. Norvell, i34 Fed. 724 (C.C. A. 5th, i9os); Clark Sparks & Sons Mule & Horse
Co. v. Americus National Bank, supra note 26; Nyssa Arcadia Drainage District v. First
National Bank, supra note 2.
'S5 F. (2d) 743 (S. D. Miss. i93i).
35i
F. (2d) 974 (C.C. A. 8th, 931).

To the same effect is Larabee Flour Mills v.

First National Bank of Dublin, 52 F. 92d) 146 (S. D. Ga. I93i).
".52 F. (2d) 817 (C.C. A. 4th, 1931).
U Id. at 81g, 82o.
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uses it for other banking purposes, such as payment of debts or creating credits in other banks, the cash in the vaults of the bank is relieved
to that extent; and, where a trust with respect to a cash item is involved,
it must be presumed that the intention was that cash remaining in the
vaults of the bank is to be substituted under the trust ... In other
words, we think that a cash item, which is accepted by a bank as cash
: , .must be treated as cash in determining whether the cash remaining in the bank is subject to a trust because of the commingling of trust
funds."
The concept of augmentation is somewhat further extended by the
same court in Schumacher v. Brinson,35 decided on the same day as the
previous case, where the court treated what was virtually a mere charging
of the depositor's account with a certain amount and crediting the bank
bond account as amounting to an augmentation. In the words of the court:
"It can make no difference that, instead of cashing a check and
then delivering the money to the bank for the purchase of the bonds, he
allowed his account to be charged with the amount necessary. The bank
had on hand funds more than sufficient for the purpose, and by the
agreement with complainant they were impressed with a trust in his
favor. . ..

The reason underlying the rule is that, by agreement be-

tween the parties, a general deposit may be converted into a special
deposit. .

.

. What we have is in effect an agreement by the bank that

a definite amount of the funds in its possession shall be held in trust
for a specified purpose. In other words, what the record discloses is, not
a shifting of credits, but the creation of a trust with respect to funds
already in the bank's possession."
While the current view, as seen from the above excerpts, marks quite a
departure and liberalization of the old view, it would seem that in some
respects it is not liberal enough, and that apparently the courts in their
anxiety not to break away entirely from the former rule have been clinging,
to use a broad metaphor, to some of the remains after body and spirit have
gone.
The first aspect that suggests itself for discussion is the well-established
requirement that in order to satisfy tracing or identification, it must appear
that enough money was present in the bank from the time of deposit to the
appointment of a receiver or liquidator to cover the claim in question, or,
expressed negatively, that a trust will not attach except to the minimum

W52

F. (2d) 821 at 822 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931).

To be sure, from the above, it would

seem that the court considered what was done in that case as the creation of a trust out
of a general deposit, and not a shifting of credits. It is submitted, however, that that is
perhaps a distinction without a difference, since the setting aside was nothing more than a
mere shifting of credit. The court seems to be somewhat illogical when it speaks of a trust
by augmentation as distinguished from a trust by agreement, as if augmentation could of
itself create a trust. As a matter of fact, it is merely an element or condition necessary to
constructive fraud and should be the same even if the trust had been created by agreement.
In other words, what the court is doing is merely calling the same thing by different names.
The case has been very recently reversed by the Supreme Court; 52 Sup. Ct. 516 (i932).

EFFECT OF INSOLVENCY ON BANK DEPOSITS

constant balance remaining in the bank for the interval in question. 36 One
asks first what practical difference that makes.
It is perhaps not too far removed to draw analogies from the common
law. Such an one would be the sale and mixture of fungible goods. A sale
of such goods may be effected under the Sales Act even though the goods be
undivided, and the number, weight, and measure unascertained. If the
quantity sold is less than is contained in the mass at the time, title will still
37
pass, the seller having to make good the deficiency from similar goods.
But even before the adoption of the Sales Act, opinion in this country
tended towards a similar view. Particularly in point is a Minnesota case,
Hall v. Pillsbury.38 In that case suit was brought to recover the value of
certain grain which had been purchased by the defendants from a warehouseman with whom the plaintiffs had deposited it for safe keeping. A Minnesota statute provided that "No person receiving or holding grain in store
shall sell or otherwise dispose of, or deliver out of the storehouse or warehouse where such grain is held or stored, the same, or any part thereof,
without the express authority of the owner of such grain, and the return
of the receipt given for the same, except as herein provided." By another
section, the delivery of grain for deposit with the warehouseman was expressly made a bailment and not a sale, changing, as the court points out,
the common law practice of viewing it as a sale and not a bailment. The
court in construing the statute said:
"The declaration that the delivery shall be deemed and treated as
a bailment must be taken as meaning that the depositor shall be deemed
"That requirement has been somewhat modified as suggested in note 28, supra, by In
re Oatway, where the court allowed a recovery of certain trust funds from a confused mass
by tracing them into shares of stock purchased with a part of the commingled fund, even
though the money left to satisfy the trust claim, sufficient when the stock was purchased,
was later used for other purposes. But that recovery was only allowed because of tracing
the money into specific property, the court taking the view that the trust money had merely
changed in form. That court apparently would not have allowed recovery if all of the
commingled mass had been dissipated and no part of it could be traced, even though subsequently there may have been redeposits sufficient to cover the trust funds at the time of
demand. See in this connection First National Bank v. Littlefield, 226 U. S. 110, 33 Sup.
Ct. 78 (1912), aff'g It re Brown, 193 Fed. 24 (C. C. A. 2d, 1912); Board of Commissioners v. Strawn, 1.57Fed. 49 (C. C. A. 6th, 1907) ; Primeau v. Granfield, 184 Fed. 480
(C. C. S. D. N. Y. 191i), reversed on another ground in 193 Fed. gi (C. C. A. 2d, 1911);
In re City Bank of Dowagiac, i86 Fed. 413 (W. D. Mich. 1919); In re A. 0. Brown &
Co., i8p Fed. 432 (S.D. N. Y. I911); Brennan v. Tillinghast, supra note 18.
'The UNIFORm SALEs AcT, §6, I U. L. A. 77 (i93i), provides: "(i) There may be
a contract to sell or a sale of an undivided share of goods. If the parties intend to effect a
present sale, the buyer, by force of the agreement, becomes an owner in common with the
owner or owners of the remaining shares. (2) In the case of fungible goods, there may
be a sale of undivided share of a specific mass, though the seller purports to sell and
the buyer to buy a definite number, weight or measure of the goods in the mass, and
though the number, weight or measure of the goods in the mass is undetermined. By such
a sale the buyer becomes owner in common of such a share of the mass as the number,
weight or measure bought bears to the number, weight or measure of the mass. If the
mass contains less than the number, weight or measure bought, the buyer becomes the
owner of the whole mass and the seller is bound to make good the deficiency from similar
goods unless a contrary intent appears." The Sales Act is now law in the majority of
the states and in the territory of Alaska.
0 43 Minn. 33, 44 N. W. 673 (I89o).
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to be the owner of, and to have on bailment in the warehouse, the
amount of grain that he deposits, although its identity may have been
lost by commingling with other, the like kind of grain, and although
not a kernel of the identical grain deposited still remains. As fast as
grain is removed, and other grain is put into the common mass, the new
grain takes the place of that originally deposited, and is appropriated
to the contract of bailment, so as to become the property of the depositor. . . But, while the interest of the depositor in the mass is measured by the amount he deposits, and mentioned in his receipt, the interest of the warehouseman, by reason of putting his own grain into the
mass, is not necessarily measured by what he puts in; for if, from any
cause for which he is responsible, as by his taking grain out from the
mass, the whole amount is diminished below what is required to fill
the outstanding receipts, what he puts in is appropriated at once, so far
as may be necessary, to the receipts, and becomes at once the property
of the holders. .

.

.

It is true, it may be the practice-probably is-

of warehousemen to take out and dispose of grain without reference to
the relation which the amount in warehouse bears to the amount of the
outstanding receipts. . ..

When this is done with the consent (such

as the statute requires) of the depositors, it is, of course, rightfully done;
and in that case a sale by the warehouseman would pass the title. No
presumption of consent on the part of the depositor could arise from the
existence, however general, of such a practice. Such a practice is made
unlawful."
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The writer is not unmindful of the fact that the above case had to do
with bailments, upon the theory of which no title passes to the bailor. It is
submitted, however, that the factor of identification and tracing is the same
in either trust or bailment, and what is sufficient in one should be sufficient
in the other. This is particularly true where the view taken by the courts
with regard to the acceptance of deposits by banks under fraudulent circumstances is either that no title passes or that the fraud avoids the passing
of title. In either case the depositee, because of the fraud, will stand in the
position of a bailee; in the first, because title never passed; in the second,
because title will revert to the depositor.
Another analogy is suggested by the marginal sales of stock cases.
Two views seem to be prevalent; one, the majority view known as the New
York rule, the other, the minority or Massachusetts. Under the New York
rule, the relation between a buyer on margin and a broker is that of pledgor
and pledgee, title being in the former. 40 Under the Massachusetts rule, title
3Id. at 35, 44 N. W. at 673. See also Woodward v. Semans, 125 Ind. 330, 25 N. E.
44o (i8go) ; Arthur v. Chicago Ry., 61 Iowa 648, 17 N. W. 24 (1883) ; Moses v. Teetors,
64 Kan. 149, 67 Pac. .26 (Igo2) ; Forbes v. Boston & L. R. R., 133 Mass. 154 (1882) ;
Ledyard v. Hibbard, 48 Mich. 421 (1882); Savage v. Salem Co., 48 Ore. 1, 85 Pac. 69
(iqo6); Bretz v. Diehle, 117 Pa. 589, ii AtI. 893 (1888); Young v. Miles, 2o Wis. 65

(i866), 23 Wis. 643 (i869).
'°Richardson v. Shaw, 2o9 U. S.365, 28 Sup. Ct. 512 (igo8) ; Sexton v. Kessler, 225
U. S.90, 32 Sup. Ct. 657 (1912); Markham v. Jaudon, 41 N. Y. 235 (1869) ; JONES, COL-
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to stock remains in the broker, there being nothing more than an executory
contract to sell to the buyer. 41 In those jurisdictions which follow the New
York view, in case of the bankruptcy of the stock broker, it has been held
that if the original securities are unavailable, the marginal buyer or "long"
customer may claim other securities of the same kind, on the theory with
some courts that there is a presumption that the new securities were intended
by the broker to replace the original; with other courts, stocks are likened
to fungible goods.
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In either view it would not be necessary that the identical security be
obtainable to satisfy tracing, nor that any constant supply of the same kind
of securities be on hand to satisfy demand by a customer at any time between
pledging and the passing of the securities into the receiver's hands. Thus,
in Duel v. Hollins,4 3 the Court held that a customer may demand the delivery
of stocks purchased for him, and such delivery may be made during insolvency without creating a preference under the Bankruptcy Act, even
though, as the dissenting opinion points out, at the time of the inception
of the bankruptcy proceedings, it did not appear that there were certificates
enough in quantity in the broker's possession "equal in amount to those which
should have been on hand". It also appeared that the broker, having sold
the original certificates, had not bought others of like kind nor kept on hand
sufficient to satisfy the several claims, and that out of 200 shares claimed,
the IOO shares on hand were not acquired with the intent to make restitution.
Justice McReynolds, in delivering the majority opinion, and restating the
language used in Gorman v. Littlefield,4 4 said:
"It was held that the certificates of stock were not the property
itself, but merely the evidence of it, and that a certificate for the same
number of shares represented precisely the same kind and value of prop(3rd ed. 1912) § 495; Smith, Margin Siocks (i922) 35
HAIv. L. REV. 485; Note (19o8) 8 COL. L. REv. 488; (igor) 15 HARv. L. REv. 78; Note
(i9o6) 19 HARv. L. REV. 529 (suggesting that the broker is a mere mortgagee because the
title of the stock is in his name); (1916) 3o HAzv. L. Rar. 8o; i Dos PASSoS, STOCKBROKERS AND STOCK-ExcHANGES (2d ed. Io5) 187, 251.
"'Covell v. Loud, 135 Mass. 41 (1883). But see Smith, supra note 40, where it is suggested that by later Massachusetts decisions the relationship of agency or trust is favored,
citing Rice v. Winslow, i8o Mass. 5oo, 62 N. E. 1057 (19o2); Crehan v. Megargel et al.,
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See also Tillinghast, Problems of Distribution it
235 Mass. 279, 126 N. E. 477 (I92O).
Bankruptcies of Stockbrokers (1930) 44 HARV. L. REv. 65 (suggesting agency relationship,
subject to hypothecation by broker) ; Note (19o6) ig HARV. L. REv. 529; (1916) 3o HARV.

L. Rxv. 8o.

'Richardson v. Shaw, supra note 4o; Sexton v. Kessler, supra note 4o; Gorman v.
Littlefield, 229 U. S. 19, 33 Sup. Ct. 690 (1913); In re Brown, i Fed. 254 (S. D. N. Y.
19o9); Caswell v. Putnam, 12o N. Y. 153, 24 N. E. 287 (1890). See (1916) 3o HARv. L.
REV. 8o, criticizing the presumption theory, and suggesting instead a constructive trust imposed by law on the wrongdoer to make specific reparation when possible. See also Oppenheimer, Rights and Obligations of Customers in Stockbrokerage Bankruptcies (1924) 37
HARv. L. REv. 86o, criticizing both theories; the presumption theory because it does not

correspond with the fact, and the grain in bin theory because unlike grain or storage receipt for gold coin, numbers and names of securities are proper earmarks.
3241 U. S. 523, 36 Sup. Ct. 615 (1916).

"Supra note 42, at 23, 33 Sup. Ct. at 691.
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erty as another certificate for a like number of shares in the same corporation; that the return of a different certificate or the substitution
of one certificate for another made no material change in the property
right of the customer; that such shares were unlike distinct articles
of personal property, differing in kind or value, as a horse, wagon or
harness, and that stock has no earmark which distinguishes one share
from another, but is like grain of a uniform quality in an elevator, one
bushel being of the same kind and value as another ...
"It is therefore unnecessary for a customer, where shares of stock
of the same kind are in the hands of a broker, being held to satisfy his
claims, to be able to put his finger upon the identical certificates of stock
purchased for him. It is enough that the broker has shares of the same
kind which are legally subject to the demand of the customer. And in
this respect the trustee in bankruptcy is in the same position as the
broker. . . . It was, as we have seen, the duty of the broker, if he sold
the shares specifically purchased for the appellant, to buy others of like
kind and to keep on hand subject to the order of the customer certificates sufficient for the legitimate demands upon him ...
"When the bankruptcy which occasioned Gornan v. Littlefield took
place the broker's box contained certificates, not specifically allotted, for
three hundred and fifty shares of the designated stock and the appellant's
claim for two hundred and fifty was the only one presented by a customer. We held that under the circumstances no more definite identification was essential, and approved his contention."
From the above decision, all that is necessary to satisfy tracing in a case
of this kind is that there be enough of the same kind of stock at the time of
bankruptcy or demand, and it would seem a fortiorithat that should be the
test when dealing with money, since the latter is devoid of any such ear45
marks as certificates of stock may be said to have.
On the other hand, if the presumption theory be applied, 46 there seems
to be no good reason why it should apply any more in the one case than in the
other, since it is a mere fiction.
Still another analogy may be found in the law of trusts as applicable
to other classes of property. It seems to be quite settled that if a trustee
wrongfully disposes of property held in trust and it comes into the hands of
a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, the cestui que trust cannot
recover from the bona fide purchaser, but if the latter should reconvey to the
trustee, the cestii que trust can come in and recover from the trustee, despite
47
the intervention of a bona fide purchaser.
See Oppenheimer's criticism of the "grain in bin" theory, supra note 42.
It would seem from the use made of the idea of substitution and intent to
in the case quoted above that both theories are resorted to at the same time. See
30 HARv. L. REv. 8o, suggesting the constructive trust hypothesis, which, of course,
apply equally well to both classes of cases.
"Williams v. Williams, 118 Mich. 477, 76 N. W. IO39 (i898); see Schutt v.
6 Barb. 373, 380 (N. Y. 1849) ; Church v. Ruland, 64 Pa. 432, 444 (1870).

restore
(1916)
should
Large,
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The same reasoning should apply to cases where money has been wrongfully disposed of by the trustee, and other money later comes into his possession. Unlike other property, money has no earmarks, and therefore under
the new tendency the identical money would not be necessary, and the trust
should reattach.
A somewhat similar analogy may be found under the Negotiable Instruments Law, which qualifies the position of a holder with regard to the assertion of personal defenses. Thus, ordinarily, not only would a bona fide
purchaser for value without notice take a negotiable instrument free from
personal defenses, but the same privilege would extend to a subsequent
holder who gets it through a bona fide purchaser for value without notice,
although he himself have notice, the latter enjoying the superior equity of
the former. But such subsequent holder would not come within this exception if he himself participate in "any fraud or illegality effecting the instrument", or if he "became bound on the instrument prior to the acquisition of
such defective title." 48
If one turns from analogies to the logic and rationale of the matter,
one finds no support there. The argument commonly made and the reason
commonly given as to why enough or more money should appear to have
been constantly present in the common mass as will cover the claim asserted,
is that in making withdrawals out of the common mass the depositor is presumed not to draw in order of time of deposit as the Clayton case 4 9 would
have it, but to draw first his own or such other money as he may lawfully
draw. There is a presumption of honesty that he will do this, and so long
as enough to cover a given claim remains, it will be considered as if the
original sum in question had been preserved intact; on the other hand, as
soon as more than what is claimed is withdrawn, the original deposit in quesI § 58 of the N. I. L. now adopted in the majority of the states and territories pro-

vides: "In the hands of any holder other, than a holder in due course, a negotiable instrument
is subject to the same defenses as if it were non-negotiable. But a holder who derives his
title through a holder in due course, and who is not himself a party to any fraud or illegality
affecting the instrument, has all the rights of such former holder in respect to all parties
prior to the latter."
§ 59 provides: "Every holder is deemed prima facie to be a holder in due course; but
when it is shown that the title of any person who has negotiated the instrument was defective, the burden is on the holder to prove that he or some person under whom he claims
acquired the title as holder in due course. But the last mentioned rule does not apply in
favor of a party who became bound on the instrument prior to the acquisition of such
defective title." See in this connection Berenson v. Conant el aL., 214 Mass. I7, io N. E.
6o (1913); Central National Bank v. Ericson, 92 Neb. 396, 138 N. W. 563 (1912); Bute
v. Williams, 162 S. W. 989 (Tex. Civ. App., i9i3). In the latter case the court said
at 994: "The rule is uncontroverted that the payee of a note which has been procured
by fraud, or as to which there are defenses between the original parties, either based upon
fraud or illegality of consideration, cannot, after the transfer of the note to an innocent purchaser for value, repurchase same and enforce it against the maker stripped of its defenses
in favor of the maker." Citing Elwell v. Tatum, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 3.07, 24 S. W. 7i (1893),
25 S. W. 434 (894).
Cf. Horan v. Mason, 141 App. Div. 89, 125 N. Y. Supp. 668 (igio).
19i Mer. .572 (Eng. 1816). The Clayton case rule is still said to be followed where
the money of the wrongdoer is not in the commingled mass. This is criticized by Scott,
supra note 16.
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tion must be considered depleted to the proportion of the surplus withdrawal
over what might have lawfully been withdrawn. In applying that line of
reasoning the courts have gone to the extent of holding that any subsequent
replacement, even though it may be money belonging to the wrongdoer himself, could not be claimed by the party injured.5 °
A close scrutiny of the above proposition on logical grounds leads the
writer to the conclusion that it is, as Ames has said,51 more fiction than fact
or truth. The matter may be stated in syllogistic form thus:
All trustees are presumed to be honest.
An honest trustee will first draw his own money, or that which he may
lawfully withdraw.
Therefore the defendant trustee must have drawn his own money or
that which he might lawfully withdraw.
Evidently the logical inference from the first premise would be that
the trustee is honest in all his dealings. Therefore, if by the second premise
the trustee is presumed to be honest in his withdrawals, he must also be presumed to be honest in his replacement. In other words he must be taken to
have the intention when he replaces the money that it should become appropriated to and part of the money of the person who had the equitable title
when it was withdrawn. And that, it is submitted, is all that is legally
52
necessary.
' See James Roscoe (Bolton) Ltd. v. Winder, supra note 27. See also cases cited in
ScOTT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 547 n.
"' Ames, supra note 16.
"See James Roscoe (Bolton) Ltd. v. Winder, supra note Z7, suggesting that if there
had been a separate trust account, subsequent payments into the account would be sufficient
indication of intention to restore what was taken, and so impose a trust by way of substitution. To like effect, but presenting the negative aspect is In re Oatway, supranote 28, which
apparently repudiates the presumption when the intent is clearly the other way, i. e., to use
the trust funds and not the trustee's own money. So also is In re Northrup et aL, 152 Fed.
763 (N. D. N. Y. i9o7), where the court says, at 774: "It would be extremely and ridiculously technical to assert that where a wrongdoer, so far as he can, rights a wrong committed in converting the money of another, by substituting at a subsequent time other
money of his own to make good that converted, the beneficial owner may not claim and
hold the substituted money or property as impressed with precisely the same trust as the
original fund . . . It does not lie with the wrongdoer, or his assignee or trustee in bankruptcy, who has made the substitution, to say that the substituted thing is neither the trust
property itself nor its proceeds, nor property purchased with the proceeds. Having made
the substitution, he should be and is estopped to deny the title of the owner of the original fund."
It would seem, though, that the court here is somewhat ambiguous in first using intent
by way of marking out a substitution, and then allowing the latter to prevail as against a
supposedlly negative intent. But since intent determines substitution, that latter must stand
or fall with it. Cf. In re McIntyre & Co., 181 Fed. 96o (C. C. A. 2d, igio).
In another case, State Savings Bank v. Thompson, et aL, 88 Kan. 461, 128 Pac. 112o
(913)
the court dealt with the proceeds of a sale of personal property made by an agent
for his principal, where the agent used up the specific proceeds, later depositing other
money as to which no superior rights attached, and the court held that the principal could
claim a later deposit, saying at 464, 128 Pac. at 12I1: "On the other hand, it has been
frequently decided that a trustee in possession of funds belonging to another, . . . may
restore the funds and substitute his own money in lieu thereof." See also Jeff ray v. Towar,
63 N. J. Eq. 530 .53 Atl. 182 (i902); Baker v. New York National Exchange Bank, ioO
N. Y. 31, 2 N. E. 452 (1885).
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From another angle, that of withdrawal, aside from any question of
replacement, the factual existence of the first premise may seriously be
doubted, and, assumed as true, presents a still greater inherent fallacy when
one attempts to apply it to certain situations. If the parties involved be the
only depositor and depositee in question, the doctrine that the latter, being
honest, would intend to use his own money first, would present no practical
and logical difficulty. The same would also be true if the depositors are
more than one but out of the number there was only one depositor whose
money was accepted under fraudulent circumstances. In that case the other
depositors' money, not being affected by fraud will have become the depositee's money, while he has become their debtor. The same might conceivably
be true if there are several depositors affected by the fraud, provided that the
money in the mixed mass had never fallen below what would be necessary
to satisfy all the claims of these several depositors should they all claim to
choose preferences on the ground of constructive trusts in their favor. But
suppose, however, what would almost always be the case under modem banking practice and operation, that there was in the last situation not enough
money all the time to have satisfied these several claims? For the purpose of
illustration, let us designate these depositors as A, B, and C, whose deposits
were $5000, $3000, and $2ooo respectively, and D as the depositee bank,
and let us assume that at one time or another while these accounts stood
to the credit of the depositors, the funds in the bank were reduced to $5000.
If any one of the depositors had sued on his particular claim, he would have
been entitled to assert his preference, because in any case there would have
been enough money at all times in the bank to take care of the claims in question. Yet, so far as the presumption of honesty is concerned, D could certainly not have been honest to A, B, and C, since he could not help knowing
of the $5ooo shortage; that $5000 would not belong to him or be considered
as his money, if we assume that the whole $io,ooo was acquired under fraudulent circumstances. D would then have to be presumed to be honest as to
A, but dishonest as to B and C, or honest as to either B and C, or both, but
dishonest as to A. We would then have the curious legal paradox of D
being honest and dishonest at the same time.
To escape this logical difficulty, two alternatives present themselves:
either D must be presumed to be dishonest as to all and to have intended to
take and use his depositors' rather than his own money, which would make
the raising of a trust impossible; or D must be presumed to be honest as to
all, and that in taking the money that he intended to replace it. The latter
would in fact become the sine qua non of the former, and since the intent is
the determining factor whether or not there was enough money continually
to take care of all or some of the claims would become immaterial, provided
there is enough at the time the assignment is made. One is thus forced to
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the conclusion that the requirement of there being enough money at all times
in the bank to take care of a claim in question is logically meaningless and on
principle unnecessary.
Turning to the requirement that there must be an augmentation of the
assets of the bank, it likewise appears unsound on close examination. The
practical consequence of this requirement would be to defeat a trust where
53
there was nothing more than a shifting of credits and debits.
The far-reaching effect of this consequence is obvious. It makes it
possible for a bank to use any manner of fraud, so long as it can show that
no actual money came to it (or s held for it) as a result of a given deposit.
Since under the modern banking system transactions of this kind are quite
frequent the extent of deposits that would be affected would be enormous. It
would affect deposits where the maker or drawer and the payee or depositor
deal with the same bank; and likewise where the drawee bank receives the
deposit in the same instance; it would affect deposits of commercial paper,
where the bank receiving the deposit forwards it for collection to an agency
with whom it has an account and to whom it owes money, the paper when
collected being credited by the agent to the forwarding bank. Also, it would
affect deposits where several intervening banks or sub-agents are used in the
process of collection, if the forwarding bank is a debtor of any or all of
the sub-agents; and likewise, if the collecting bank, whether agent or subagent, although itself not a creditor, should credit collection to another of its
clients to whom the forwarding bank owes money.
Looked at logically, this whole idea of requiring receipt of actual money
by the insolvent bank itself or by someone acting as its agent is meaningless
and without practical effect. As aptly pointed out by one court opposed to
that idea, if an actual exchange of money would satisfy the requirement, to
effect a transfer without such exchange is merely a time-saving device which
avoids a useless procedure. 54 Tn any one of the instances given above, the
money might first have been made to come in the form of an actual cash
deposit, which would have satisfied the requirement under discussion. For
instance, if the drawer of a bill of exchange and the payee deal with the
same bank, the former may have withdrawn the amount of the bill and paid
it to the payee directly, and the latter may have instantly redeposited the sum
thus obtained in the same bank to his own credit. That would have been an
augmentation of the assets of the bank, and yet the bank would not have
been any richer than if it had shifted the amount in question from the credit
of the drawer to the credit of the payee. The situation is somewhat similar
where the insolvent bank collects through another bank, a sub-agent to whom
'Clark

Sparks & Sons Mule & Horse Co. v. Americus National Bank, supra note 26;

Nyssa Arcadia Drainage District v. First National Bank, etc., supra note 2; Phoenix Title
& Trust Co. v. The Central Bank of Phoenix et al., 3o Ariz. 431, 247 Pac. Io97 (1926).
"State v. McKinley County Bank, supra note 8.
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it owes money. The sub-agent bank would have turned the money collected
over to the insolvent bank, which in its turn could have instantly paid back an
equal amount out of the common mass. Technically there would have been
an increase of the assets of the bank; in either case, however, the assets of
the bank would have remained the same. The only practical difference is
that of time, and that is distinctly in favor of a book transfer of credits.
The same useless procedure might have been gone through with an agent for
the insolvent bank, but with no practical difference.
There is all the more reason for disregarding such useless procedure
when dealing with courts of equity. As remarked by the court in State v.
McKinley County Bank, 55 the maxim "Equity considers that done which
ought to be done" should be applicable to situations like this. A bank
handling sums under circumstances such as would impress them with a trust
must be considered as charged with a duty to preserve these sums so as to
make them available to the parties entitled to them, and that duty would
attach whether the sum in question has to come out of the mass or comes
to the bank in the form of something new. In the latter case, the bank, if
it were honest, would not have accepted the money offered as a deposit, or
having accepted it, would express its intention to the depositors to keep it
separate as a bailment or trust; in the first instance, if it were honest, it would
make immediate payment to the party entitled to it, or would separate the
sum out of the general mass, signifying its intention thereafter to keep it for
such party as a bailment or trust. In either case, if it does not do what in
honesty it should and could have done, a court of equity should consider it
as done.
Finally, is it equitable to allow a party to profit by its own act of misfeasance or malfeasance as against an innocent depositor? The argument is
commonly advanced that after all it is not the guilty party, the bank itself,
that would profit, but all the other depositors. But, would it be equitable to
allow general creditors to profit at the expense of an innocent depositor who
has, except as to a meaningless requirement, a better and prior right? Surely
it is an a fortiori case where the benefit accruing to the general creditors
comes through or is a result of the bank's fraud. Furthermore, on principle,
a creditor cannot claim more than what the bankrupt has, and an assignment
in bankruptcy generally does not cover such property.58 It would seem,
therefore, that there is no basis in principle or in practice for denying priority because of the nature of the shifting of credit.
Supra note 8.
rGardner v. Rowe,

2

Sirn. & St. 346 (Eng. 1825).

